Stochastic games are two-player repeated games in which a state variable follows a Markov chain controlled by both players. The model was initially proposed by Shapley (1953) who proved the existence of the discounted values. In spite of the great interest that it generated, the convergence of the values was proved more than 20 years later, by Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) . A characterization has been missing since then. In this paper, we provide one.
Introduction
Stochastic games are repeated games in which a state variable follows a Markov chain controlled by both players and where players receive payoffs at every stage. The players maximize a discounted sum of these payoffs, where the discount factor stands for their impatience. See Sorin [13, Chapter 5] , for a reference on this topic.
The model was initially proposed by Shapley [12] in the 50's in a finite and zero-sum framework, that is, the set of states K and the sets of actions I and J at every state are finite. In this seminal paper, the author proved that the stochastic game with discount factor λ has a value for each initial state, and that the vector of values v λ ∈ R K is the unique fixed point of a contracting operator Φ, that is v λ = Φ(λ, v λ ). In the late 70's, the convergence of the values was established by Bewley and Kohlberg [3] using the so-called algebraic approach, which relies on a deep result from real algebraic geometry, the Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem. Building on this approach, Mertens and Neyman [8] established a few years later that the uniform value exists, meaning that the players can guarantee the limit value in a very robust manner. More precisely, the players can play well, and approximately obtain this limit, even if they do not know the discount factor, provided that it is sufficiently low and that they observe their past payoffs. An alternative approach was recently proposed by Oliu-Barton [9] to recover these two results with linear programming and probabilistic tools.
One may argue that the sum of stage payoffs need not be a discounted sum, and that the players may maximize their average payoff instead. It turns out that for nstage repeated games with average stage payoffs, the values v n also converge, and to the same limit as discounted values. This result, due to Bewley and Kohlberg [2] , was recently extended by Ziliotto [15] to more general criteria, namely when the weights on the stage payoffs are no longer discounted nor constant, but (almost) arbitrary. In other words, no matter how the players evaluate the sequence of stage payoffs, the values converge to the same limit, as their impatience goes to 0. Yet, a characterization for this common limit was missing so far.
Up to date, only a restricted family of stochastic games is well understood, the socalled absorbing games. In these games, all states except the initial one are absorbing, so that the state changes (at most) once and for all. The best well-known example of these games is the Big Match, introduced by Gillette in the late 50's and solved by Blackwell and Ferguson [5] . Absorbing games are attractive because of their greater simplicity: they can be represented by two matrices, one for the payoffs and another one for the probabilities of absorption. For this reason, in spite of being a relatively small class within the set of stochastic games, their study has deserved lots of attention. In particular, three characterizations have been obtained for the limit value. The first one, due to Kohlberg [6] , states that the limit value is the unique real number where a strictly monotone function changes of sign. The function is very closely related to the derivative of Shapley's operator, which was later studied by Rosenberg and Sorin [11] . The second, due to Laraki [7] expresses the limit value as the value of a matrix game where players play some linearly perturbed strategies. In the third, due to Sorin and Vigeral [14] , the limit value appears as the value of a matrix game played with standard, mixed strategies, but with a special payoff function involving the median of three numbers. Surprisingly, some of the ideas that Kohlberg [6] introduced in the very specific context of absorbing games, are still useful in the general case. The key idea is that the system of equations given by Shapley:
precisely, if G k and Q k denote, respectively, the payoff and the transition functions at state k, then, whereas the k-th equation in the first system depends on
Once the system is uncoupled, one can use Kohlberg's approach to characterize the limit values, state by state.
Our first contribution consists in characterizing v k λ alone, for each k, as the unique real number z satisfying Ψ k (λ, z) := val(W k (λ, z)) = 0, where W k (λ, z) is an explicit I K × J K matrix game given below. The second and main contribution of this paper is a characterization of the limit values lim λ→0 v k λ as the unique point where the following strictly decreasing function changes of sign:
λ n where n = |K| is the number of states. Section 2 is devoted to present the model and main results. Section 3 to their proofs. In Section 4 we give some comments and concluding remarks.
Model and main results
Our paper provides a characterization for the discounted values of finite zero-sum stochastic games, and of their limits. As already pointed out in the introduction, the limit is common to discounted and n-stage games, and even to more general averaging criteria, as the weights of each stage vanish.
Standard stochastic games
Stochastic games are described by a 5-tuple Γ = (K, I, J, g, q), where K is the set of states, I and J are the action sets of Player 1 and 2 respectively, g : K × I × J → R is the payoff function and q : K × I × J → ∆(K) is the transition function. For each finite set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X.
We assume throughout the paper that K, I and J are finite sets, and K = {1, . . . , n}.
The stochastic game Γ k λ
For any discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] and any k ∈ K, the λ-discounted game with initial state k is denoted by Γ k λ and proceeds as follows: at every stage m ≥ 1, knowing the current state k m , the players choose simultaneously and independently actions i m and j m . Player 1 receives the stage payoff g(k m , i m , j m ), and Player 2 receives −g(k m , i m , j m ). Then, a new state k m+1 is drawn according to the probability q(· | k m , i m , j m ) and communicated to both players. Player 1 maximizes the expectation of a λ-discounted average of the stage payoffs, i.e. the expectation of:
Definition 2.1 A stationary strategy for Player 1 is a mapping x : K → ∆(I).
Similarly, a stationary strategy for player 2 is a mapping y : K → ∆(J). Similarly, the set of stationary strategies for player 2 is ∆(J) K .
The sequence (k 1 , i 1 , j 1 , ..., k m , i m , j m , ...) generated along the game is called a play. We denote by P k x,y the unique probability measure on the set of plays
The expectation with respect to this probability is denoted by E k σ,τ , and the expected payoff by:
In order to solve the game, Shapley [12] introduces the following.
is the I × J-matrix game with payoff:
Shapley [12] established that the stochastic game Γ k λ has a value which satisfies:
Moreover, the vector of values is the unique fixed point of Shapley's operator, and both players have optimal stationary strategies x λ and y λ . Also, a stationary strategy is optimal in Γ k λ for all k ∈ K if and only its k-th coordinate is an optimal mixed strategy in the local game G k (λ, v λ ) for all k ∈ K. We will refer to these strategies as being optimal in Γ λ .
Main results
The main result of this paper is a characterization of lim λ→0 v λ ∈ R K . Our characterization is uncoupled in the sense that for each initial state k ∈ K, lim λ→0 v k λ is characterized separately. A key element in our proof is an uncoupled characterization of v k λ for a fixed discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1]. In order to state our results, we need to introduce n + 1 auxiliary matrices ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n of size |I| n × |J| n , obtained from the following matrix which gathers all the data of the game:
where for each k, ℓ ∈ K we denote by Q k,ℓ and G k the following I × J-matrices:
and where U stands for a I × J matrix of 1's. The introduction of these matrices is inspired from the theory of multi-parameter eigenvalue problems (see Atkinson [1] , for a reference on this topic).
Definition 2.4
• For each λ ∈ (0, 1] we define the matrix:
where det ⊗ stands for the determinant with respect to the Kronecker product ⊗. The definition and basic properties of these products can be found in Section 3.1.
• For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and each k ∈ K we define the matrix:
where the appearing in the k-th column indicates the omission of this column.
• For each λ ∈ (0, 1], k ∈ K and z ∈ R we define the matrix game:
• For each k ∈ K and z ∈ R we define the function F k : R → R ∪ {−∞, +∞} by:
The existence of the limits will be proved below.
Note that W k (λ, z) is a matrix game of size |I| n × |J| n that depends only (k, λ, z) and the data of the game. Similarly, F k depends only on k and the data of the game.
We can now state our two main results.
Theorem 2.5 For any λ ∈ (0, 1] and k ∈ K, the value v k λ of the stochastic game Γ k λ is the unique z ∈ R satisfying:
Moreover, for any optimal stationary strategy x λ ∈ ∆(I) n of player 1 in Γ λ , the vector
Theorem 2.6 For any k ∈ K, the values v k λ converge to the unique w k ∈ R satisfying:
3 The proofs
Preliminaries on Kronecker products
Let us start by recalling the definition of the Kronecker product ⊗ (or tensor product) of two matrices and the corresponding determinant det ⊗ .
Definition 3.1
• The Kronecker product of the m×n matrix A and the p×q matrix B is a mp×nq matrix defined by blocks as follows:
• Suppose that A 11 , . . . , A nn are n 2 matrices such that for each row k, A k1 , . . . , A kn are of same size. The Kronecker determinant is defined by:
where S(n) stands for the set of permutations of {1, . . . , n} and ǫ(σ) is the signature of σ.
Some useful and standard properties of these products are listed below:
(K1) The product ⊗ is bilinear and associative, but not commutative.
(K2) Let A 1 , . . . , A n and B 1 , . . . , B n some matrices such that the product A k B k is well defined. Then:
. . , n. Then for each entry (r, s) of det ⊗ (A 11 , . . . , A n,n ) there exists a unique (i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i n , j n ) ∈ I 1 ×J 1 ×· · ·×I n ×J n such that:
The determinant det ⊗ has the same properties as the usual determinant, i.e. it is multilinear and alternating.
(K6) Let A 1 , . . . , A n be some I × J-matrices. Then, explicitly, the relation between (r, s) and the unique (i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i n , j n ) ∈ (I × J) n of (K3) and (K4), which is the same, is given by:
Characterization of the discounted values
Let us start by an elementary lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Let A = (a 11 , . . . , a nn ) be a strictly diagonally dominant n×n real matrix satisfying a kk ≥ 0 and a kk − ℓ =k |a kℓ | ≥ λ for all k = 1, . . . , n, for some λ > 0. Then det A ≥ λ n .
Proof. Let µ ∈ R satisfy µ < λ. The matrix A − µ Id is then still strictly diagonally dominant, so that A − µ Id is invertible. It follows that all real eigenvalues of A should be greater or equal to λ. Similarly, let µ ∈ C satisfy |µ| < λ. Again, A − µ Id is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix, so that A − µ Id is invertible. Hence, the modulus of every eigenvalue of A is greater or equal to λ. Let a + bi and a − bi be a pair of conjugate non-real eigenvalues. Then
where the last inequality follows from our previous argument. The determinant of A, which is equal to the product of all its eigenvalues, is thus larger than λ n since the contribution of every real eigenvalue is at least λ, and the contribution of every pair of conjugate eigenvalues is at least λ 2 .
Lemma 3.3 All the entries of (−1) n ∆ 0 λ are larger than λ n .
Proof. Mutiplying each column of ∆ 0 λ by −1 we obtain that
for some nonnegative I × J matrices (A k,ℓ ) satisfying, for all k ∈ K:
By property (K4), the (r, s)-th entry of (−1) n ∆ 0 λ is equal to the determinant, in the usual sense, of some matrix (A i 1 ,j 1 11 , . . . , A in,jn nn ). The condition (3.1) implies that each of these matrices satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.2. Hence, their determinants are larger or equal than λ n .
The following result, which is a direct consequence from Lemma 3.3, will be useful in Section 3.3.
Lemma 3.4 For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and k ∈ K:
(i) u → val(W k (λ, u)) is strictly decreasing and continuous.
(ii) lim u→−∞ val(W k (λ, u)) = +∞ and lim u→+∞ val(W k (λ, u)) = −∞.
Proof. (i)
The continuity follows from the continuity of the map u → W k (λ, u) and the continuity of the value operator. Now, fix u 1 < u 2 . By Lemma 3.3, the matrix (−1) n ∆ 0 λ has all its entries bigger than λ n . Hence, for each (r, s) the entry W k r,s (λ, u 1 ) satisfies:
This inequality implies the desired result.
(ii) The boundedness of ∆ k λ and Lemma 3.3 imply lim u→−∞ W k (λ, u) = +∞U and lim u→+∞ W k (λ, u) = −∞U . The result follows then from the continuity of the value operator.
The next lemma will be useful in the sequel, namely to prove Proposition 3.6. It establishes a crucial link between the expected payoff induced by a couple of stationary strategies γ k λ (x, y) and the matrices ∆ k λ and ∆ 0 λ introduced earlier, for each k ∈ K.
Notation. For any x ∈ ∆(I) K , define its injection x ∈ ∆(I K ) as follows:
Similarly, y ∈ ∆(J K ) denotes y := y 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ y n for any y ∈ ∆(J) K .
Lemma 3.5 For any λ ∈ (0, 1], k ∈ K, and (x, y) ∈ ∆(I) K × ∆(J) K one has:
Proof. Let k ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1) and (x, y) be fixed throughout the proof. Let P xy and g xy be, respectively, the Markov chain and the vector of payoffs induced by (x, y). That is, for each ℓ, ℓ ′ ∈ K:
Let γ(x, y) = ((γ ℓ λ (x, y)) ℓ∈K be the vector of expected payoffs for all possible initial states. By stationarity, one has:
where the denominator is strictly positive because Id −(1 − λ)P xy has a strictly dominant diagonal. On the other hand, using (K2) (applied twice) and the fact that t x ℓ U y ℓ = 1 for each ℓ = 1, . . . , n one has:
where the (−1) n comes from multiplying the matrix by −1. Similarly:
Proposition 3.6 Let λ ∈ (0, 1] and let x λ ∈ ∆(I) K be an optimal stationary strategy of player 1 in Γ λ . Then, for all k ∈ K, the mixed strategy
Proof. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1] and k ∈ K, and let x λ ∈ ∆(I) K be an optimal stationary strategy. Let y ∈ J n denote a pure stationary strategy and y = y 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ y n , which by (K6) is a vertex of ∆(J n ). By Lemma 3.5, one has:
As (−1) n t x∆ 0 λ y > 0 thanks to Lemma 3.3, by linearity one has:
which proves the result.
Proof. It follows directly by exchanging the roles of the players.
Theorem 2.5 follows directly from Proposition 3.6, Corollary 3.7 and Lemma 3.4.
Characterization of the limit values
Lemma 3.8 For each k ∈ K, the function F k defined in Definition 2.4 is well-defined. Moreover, there exists a unique w k ∈ R satisfying:
Proof. Fix u ∈ R. Let us start by proving that
has a limit in R ∪ {−∞, +∞}. The entries of W k (λ, u) are polynomials in λ. Hence, for each λ ∈ (0, 1], its value is a rational fraction R(λ) corresponding to some ShapleySnow kernel. For each λ there are finitely many possible rational fractions satisfying val(W k (λ, u)) = R(λ), since there are finitely many Shapley-Snow Kernels. As the λ → val(W k (λ, u)) is continuous, it can only change to one rational fraction to another at the points where the two meet. Yet, as two different rational fractions can only intersect finitely many times, there exists λ 0 > 0 and a rational fraction R 0 such that
The existence of the limit follows. Now, let u 1 < u 2 . Thanks to Lemma 3.3, for each entry (r, s) on has:
This inequality implies:
Dividing by λ n and taking the limit as λ goes to 0, one obtains:
On the other hand, lim u→−∞ F k (u) = +∞ and lim u→+∞ F k (u) = −∞ by Lemma 3.4.
The result follows, since we have shown that F k is strictly decreasing in the interval where it takes finite value.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Fix k ∈ K. By Lemma 3.8, there exists a unique
Hence, there exists δ > 0 and λ 0 > 0 such that for all λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ):
Or, equivalenty, val(W k (λ, u ′ )) ≥ δλ n > 0 for all λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ). But now, on the one hand the map u → val(W k (λ, u)) is strictly decreasing for each λ, by Lemma 3.4 (i). On the other hand, val(W k (λ, v k λ )) = 0, by Corollary 3.7. Consequently, for all λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ):
Taking the limits, and as ε is arbitrary, yields:
Similarly, taking u ′′ := w k + ε yields lim sup λ→0 v k λ ≤ w k , which concludes the proof.
Theorem 4.1 (Kohlberg 1974 ) The limit value of Γ 1 λ is the unique real w satisfying:
Suppose w.l.o.g. that the players have one action at state k = 1, and let g k be its payoff. Then:
and ∆ 0 λ and ∆ 1 λ satisfy:
where U is a I × J matrix of 1's. The game W (λ, z) reduces then to:
Consequently:
which shows that our characterization is the same as the one obtained by Kohlberg, for absorbing games.
The auxiliary games
Let us provide some remarks on the games W k (λ, z). First of all, note that from Lemma 3.5 one can derive the following alternative expression for v k λ as the value of the following one-shot game:
x∆ 0 λ y played either over ∆(I K ) and ∆(J K ), or over the subsets ∆(I) K and ∆(J) K , with the natural inclusion of ∆(R) S to ∆(R S ) given by a : ∆(R) S → a 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ a S ∈ ∆(R S ).
As already noticed by Shapley [12] , x λ ∈ ∆(I) K is an optimal stationary strategy in Γ k λ , for all k ∈ K, if and only if x k λ is an optimal mixed strategy in the local game G k (λ, v λ ), for all k ∈ K. Thus, one can determine an optimal stationary strategy x λ provided that one knows the vector of values v λ , and vice versa. Our approach, which has the novelty of proposing un uncoupled system, has the following implications on strategies.
is a optimal stationary strategy in the local game G k (λ, v λ ).
States 3 and 4 are absorbing, with payoff 1 and −1 respectively. W.l.o.g. we suppose that each player has one action only in these states. The data of the game is then represented by the following matrix:
The situation is similar for both non-absorbing initial states, so let us examine the initial state 1 only. Taking the appropriate Kronecker determinants, we obtain:
For z = 0, we have W 1 (λ, 0) = ∆ 1 λ . A calculation 1 gives val(W 1 (λ, 0)) = 2λ 4 + o(λ 4 ) so that F 1 (0) = 2. For z > 0, it is enough to check that player 2 can guarantee a payoff smaller or equal than −2zλ 7/2 + o(λ 7/2 ), so that F 1 (z) = −∞ for all z > 0. A symmetric argument shows that player 1 can guarantee −2zλ 7/2 + o(λ 7/2 ) for any z < 0, so that:
By Theorem 2.6, lim λ→0 v 1 λ = 0.
Remarks
1. From our approach, one can infer the following upper bound for the speed of convergence of the values:
where N = min(|I|, |J|) |K 0 | and K 0 ⊂ K is the subset of non-absorbing states. This bound is tight for absorbing games, and is substantially better than the previous known bound N = (|I||K|) |I||K|/2 , obtained in [9] .
2. The term (−1) n in the definition of W k (λ, z) is, of course, of little importance. We chose to include it in order to ensure that ∆ 0 λ is positive and thus, F k is decreasing, independently of the number of states. Also, this way we recover the characterization for absorbing games.
3. The function F k is intriguing. It is decreasing, has slope smaller than −1 on the interval where it takes finite values, the sign of F k (w k ) is equal to the sign of v k λ − w k , but we do not know under which circumstances this interval reduces to a singleton, as is the case in our example.
4. Theorem 2.6 implies the following: for any two states k and ℓ, w k = w ℓ if and only if F k (z)F ℓ (z) ≥ 0 everywhere, except at most one point.
5
. A better understanding of the crucial matrices ∆ 0 λ , ∆ 1 λ , . . . , ∆ n λ would be very useful. Namely, what is the connection between these matrices and the ergodic structure of the chain ?
6. Recently, Oliu-Barton and Ziliotto [10] proved that stochastic games satisfy the constant payoff property, that is, under optimal play, the cumulated payoff grows linearly during the game. One naturally expects a deep connection between the characterization above and this strong property.
